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CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON CREDITORS'
SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION RIGHTS UNDER
U.C.C. SECTION 9-503-DEVELOPMENTS
IN ILLINOIS SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
Michael 1. Spak* and Donald F. Spak**
The nationwide attacks on creditors' right of sell-help in repossession
cases has culminated this year in significant judicial developments affecting
rights and obligations of debtors in secured transactions. The authors
examine the recent Illinois decisions interpreting Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. In an analysis of Sniadach, Fuentes, and other
decisions radically altering the "freedom of contract" doctrine, Messrs.
Spak consider the constitutionality of prejudgment repossession under the
UCC; they reluctantly conclude that repossession statutes are not illegal,
notwithstanding the deprivation of due process by individual secured creditors.
INTRODUCTION

INCE the previous survey of secured transactions appeared two

years ago, 1 the Illinois courts have decided a number of interesting cases involving the interpretation and application of
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. These cases have
involved deficiency balances and judgments, dealers in the ordinary
course of business, and fixtures. Furthermore, the last two years
have witnessed continued constitutional challenges to the self-help
repossession provisions of Article Nine. A discussion of these developments follows.
* Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
**
Member of the Illinois Bar.
The authors acknowledge the assistance of their research assistant, Richard Merel,
a De Paul law student.
1. Spak, Secured Transactions,1971-1972 Survey of Illinois Law, 22 DE PAUL L.
REv. 177 (1972).
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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS

Deficiency Balance and Judgments
The focal case regarding judgments upon deficiency balances
after the sale of the collateral by the creditor is Tauber v. Johnson.2 In this case the First District Appellate Court considered the
appropriate remedy to be applied (1) where the debtor is not properly notified of the intended sale of the collateral, and (2) where
the interest rate was usurious under Illinois law.' The trial court
ruled that the contract was legal and enforceable, but only to the
legal rate of interest. The debtor appealed the ruling, contending
that the entire contract should be unenforceable because the interest rate was illegal. The appellate court, through Justice English,
affirmed the trial court by holding that the statute, which applies
criminal liability to a person who knowingly violates the statute,
merely makes the excessive interest provision unenforceable. The
court "cannot read into the statute an additional general penalty
declaring the entire contract void if any of its provisions are violated."4
The second issue before the Tauber court, whether the deficiency
balance is collectable even .though the creditor had not fully complied with the notice provisions of section 9-507, is of somewhat
wider interest. One year before, in Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson,5
the Third District Appellate Court had followed the liberal trend
by holding that the creditor's non-compliance with the notice provisions had the legal effect of extinguishing the obligation of the
debtor for a subsequent deficiency balance.' The liberal approach
of Morris makes compliance with the UCC notice provisions a condition precedent to the collection of the deficiency balance. Although following the conservative approach which a literal reading
of the Code dictates, the Tauber court reached the same result.
The Code states that:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or restrained
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

8 Ill. App. 3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180 (lst Dist. 1972).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, § 562.9 (1971).
8 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 291 N.E.2d at 182.
133 Il1. App. 2d 717, 271 N.E.2d 404 (3d Dist. 1971).
For a complete discussion of Morris and its context, see Spak, supra note 1.
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on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the
debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest
has been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a
right to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to
comply with the provisions of this Part. . .. 7

By combining this section of the Code and two interesting presumptions, Tauber was able to arrive at the same conclusion as
the court in Morris. The first presumption was that the collateral
would have sold for its proper value had the debtor been properly
notified of the sale. The second presumption was that the proper
value is at least the amount still owing on the debt. The court then
concluded that unless the creditor can rebut the presumptions and
prove that the sale was commercially reasonable, the sale will not be
so considered. Under this Code provision then, the debtor would have
the right to recover any loss caused by the commercially unreasonable sale, i.e., ,the amount still owing on 'the debt following the sale
of the collateral. The creditor would still have the right to recover
the deficiency balance from the debtor. The practical effect of
this ruling is that the two debts will offset each other so that the deficiency balance will be uncollectable from the debtor.
Several recent cases have involved issues related to notification
by the creditor. In Tauber the case concerned proof of notification. The first district held that a letter stating the creditor's intent to sell the collateral need not be received by the debtor, so long
as the letter is properly mailed.
In Prairie Vista, Inc. v. Casella,8 the Fourth District Appellate
Court also discussed notification, but here it was in terms of the
time requirements for a reasonable notice under section 9-504(3).
The debtor returned the keys to his mobile home to his creditor.
On April 7, 1971, the creditor mailed a notice of sale of the collateral to take place on April 10. The letter was received on April 8,
but April 9 was a holiday. Since there was no effective opportunity for the debtor to prepare for the sale, the trial court found the
notice to be unreasonable under the Code, and the appellate court
affirmed the decision.
In Application of Bickel,9 the appellate court held that a misde7. UCC § 9-507(1).
8. 12 Ill. App. 3d 34, 297 N.E.2d 385 (4th Dist. 1973).
9. 14 Ill. App. 3d 813, 303 N.E.2d 541 (1st Dist. 1973).
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scription of the collateral to be sold is not enough to violate the
the standard of commercial reasonableness regarding notice:
The debtors do not claim that they were in ignorance as to what was transpiring. They did nothing prior to, or at the sale, with reference to the
method, manner, time, place or terms of sale. They were represented by
counsel at the sale who made no objections. 10

Another point raised on appeal was that there was a discrepancy
between the actual value of the property and the price received
at sale. The debtors contended that the discrepancy was relevant
to a determination of whether the sale was commercially reasonable. The court disagreed, holding that "mere inadequacy of price
in the absence of fraud, mistaken or illegal practices does not vitiate
such a sale.""
Dealersin the OrdinaryCourse of Business

The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision in American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Mar-K-Z Motors
& Leasing Co.' 2 Mar-K-Z was in the business of leasing cars;

the company purchased each car new, leased it for a period of two
years, and then sold the used car. To finance the purchase of the
cars, Mar-K-Z entered into a secured transaction with a lender.
The automobile involved in this case was a 1969 Buick which was
purchased with a loan from the plaintiff, the Idea Bank, and
leased to a lessee. When the lease was terminated, the car was
returned to Mar-K-Z and then sold as a used car to the defendant, Henry Buttel. Mar-K-Z defaulted on the loan to the bank,
and the bank proceeded in replevin against Mr. Buttel to recover
the automobile. The key point in the case, and the major issue
on appeal, was whether the leasing company was "a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind." Section 9-307 provides that
"A buyer in the ordinary course of business," who is one who purchases the item from "a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind," takes free from a security interest in the collateral. At issue
was whether the subsequent purchaser of the used car must return
his purchase to the bank. In a concise opinion, the court held
10. Id. at 816, 303 N.E.2d at 543-44.
11. Id.
12. 11 Ill.
App. 3d 1046, 298 N.E.2d 209 (1st Dist. 1973), afI'd, 57 11.2d 29,
309 N.E.2d 567 (1974).
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that Mar-K-Z was in the business of selling used cars and that
the defendant was a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, Mr. Buttel was able to keep his used car.
Fixtures

The treatment of fixtures under the UCC was discussed in Landfield Finance Co. v. Feinerman,'3 in Which the question was

whether the 12,000 items of personal property in a hotel were fixtures or personalty. The Appellate Court of the First District,
Third Division, through Justice Dempsey, held that the determination of whether property is a fixture or personalty is dependent
upon the intent of the parties. In this case, the court determined
the articles to be personalty because a chattel mortgage had formerly been entered into. "The acceptance of a chattel mortgage
has been found to express very strong evidence of intent that such
items were to remain personalty and not be considered a part of
the Real Estate."' 4
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Until recently a debtor had no specific legal right to protect him
from the eager grasp of the creditor. Under the "freedom of contract"
,theory, parties could provide that a creditor could attach the debt-

or's wages, have the sheriff seize his personal property, or even repossess his automobile, all without any notice or hearing. According to the prevailing philosophy, if the debtor had a defense, he

could recover his property after the trial or by judicial process.

5

Recently, however, this "total freedom of contract" doctrine was
severely limited by the United States Supreme Court in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.1 and Fuentes v. Shevin. 7 Sniadach struck

down prejudgment wage garnishments as violative of due process, 1' while Fuentes declared indiscriminate prejudgment replevin
statutes unconstitutional. 19
13.
14.

3 II1. App. 3d 487, 279 N.E.2d 30 (1st Dist. 1972).
Id. at 491, 279 N.E.2d at 34.

15. This is an interesting "Presumption of guilt" found nowhere else in the law.
"/-.-395 U.S.337-(196;9).............
17. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See generally Note, The Fuentes Case: Sniadach Made
Clear, 22 DEPAUtL L. REV. 499 (1972).
18. 395 U.S. at 342.

19. 407 U.S. at 84,
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This Article will now analyze the Supreme Court's holdings in Sniadach and Fuentes and will attempt to ascertain whether, as a logical extension of. these holdings, the Supreme Court must decide
against the constitutionality of repossession by self-help under section 9-503 of the UCC .20

The Sniadach Decision
Mrs. Christine Sniadach allegedly owed $420 on a promissory
note to Family Finance, and to collect the debt Family Finance instituted a garnishment action. Under Wisconsin law, Sniadach's employer was required to withhold one-half of her wages pending a
court determination of the case. 2 Mrs. Sniadach attacked this prejudgment garnishment provision as violative of the due process
requirement of the fourteenth amendment. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court rejected Mrs. Sniadach's contention,2 2 but the United States
Supreme Court reversed.23
The fourteenth amendment's prohibition of state deprivation of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," encompasses three factors: (1) state action, (2) deprivation of property,
and •(3) satisfaction of due process. 24 The requirement of state
20. The

UNIFOSM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 states:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace
or may proceed by action. If the security agreement provides, the secured
-party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available. to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party
which is reasonably *convenient to both parties. Without removal a
secured party may remedy equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under section 9-504.
21. Wis. LAws ch. 507, § 267.18(2)(a), 0.7(1) (1965). A portion of this enactment is presently in effect. Wis. STAT. § 267.07(1) (Supp. 1972). The Wisconsin
law allowed a plaintiff creditor seeking a prejudgment garnishment against a debtor
to serve a summons and complaint on the debtor within ten days after service on
the person holding debtor's- wages. Therefore, prejudgment garnishments could be
obtained without notice to the debtor and without a hearing. Wis. STAT. § 267.07(1)
(Supp. 1972).
22. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
23. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
24. Portions from the following text have appeared in Spak, The Constitutionality of Repossession by Secured Creditors Under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 Hous. L. REV. 855 (1973) and Spak, Survey of Constitutional Law,
50 Cm.-KENrr L. REV.. 248 (1973).
.
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action is met when the action has as its source a person or an
agency formally identifiable as a state instrumentality, regardless
of the position of the particular officer or agency in the governmental hierarchy. 25 In Sniadach, the prejudgment garnishment statute
could be enforced only through the action of the state court, and so
state action was present.
Prior to Sniadach, it was commonly accepted that "deprivation
of property" referred to the title of property. If a property owner
had been permanently deprived of the use of his property because
title was seized, there was a deprivation. In the prejudgment garnishment proceedings, the wages were only temporarily frozen, and
if the garnishee prevailed at trial, all of the wages would be returned. It was reasoned that such a deprivation of property was
only temporary and that a true deprivation had not occurred.
Sniadach upset the traditional deprivation arguments by holding that even a temporary freezing of wages was a deprivation
of property under the fourteenth amendment. 26 Rather than declaring that any temporary deprivation of property by a state is
forbidden, the decision adhered to the traditional meaning of deprivation, but carved an exception for wages. The Court characterized wages as "a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system; '2 7 therefore even the temporary
deprivation of wages under the prejudgment wage garnishment statute was deemed to constitute a deprivation of property violating the
fourteenth amendment.2"
The general rule of "due process" is that before a person may be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, he must be given notice that will
afford an opportunity for a hearing. 29 The concept of procedural
due process is rooted in the spirit of fundamental fairness to the
individual, subject to the needs of society only in extraordinary situations.3 1 Justice Douglas, writing for the Sniadach Court, ack25. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
26. 395 U.S. at 339.
27. Id. at 340.
28. Id. at 341-42.
29. E.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962).
30. In some extraordinary situations the United States Supreme Court found the
due process requirements of notice and a hearing before seizure less important than
te isOlzaiQP o sqizvre of property in the tare of arn Qverwhelmin public intereat.
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nowledged the need for summary procedures in some unusual instances, but noted that the facts in Sniadach did not present a situation requiring special protection to either the state or the creditor;
further, the Wisconsin statute was not narrow enough to meet any
unusual condition. 3 Finally, in personam jurisdiction was possible in Snidach because the debtor was a resident of the state and
was amenable to personal service. Thus, since none of the exceptions to the due process rule applied, the Court held that the debtor
must be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing before her
2
wages could be denied.
Having invalidated a traditional creditor remedy, Sniadach fostered a wide range of opinion and speculation in the legal community as to whether its ruling extended to all prejudgment remedies or was limited to analogous situations. At the time many
commentators predicted that Sniadach would be narrowly construed, to be applied only in those situations involving special property interests.8 3 This position could be justified if Sniadach's
breadth were governed by the actual language employed by Justice
Douglas in the majority opinion. Based upon the express language
used by the Court, one could reasonably conclude that the Sniadach court had no intention of making a full-scale attack on all
provisional remedies, but rather attempted to define due process requirements in the taking of property as a function of the hardship
attached to the taking-the more serious the hardship, the more
demanding the requirements.3 4 Since -the garnishment of wages
See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601-02 (1950) (allowed
summary seizure of misbranded items or those dangerous to health); Fahey v. Mallonn, 332 U.S. 245, 256-57 (1947) (permitted seizure of a bank's assets during an
investigation).
31. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
32. Id. at 342.
33. See Note, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.: Due Process for the Low Income Wage Earner, 6 CALIF. W.L. REV. 339, 340, 343 (1970).
See also Note,
Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages: A "Fair" Concept of Due Process, 35 Mo. L.
REV. 405, 406-407 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law-Prejudgment Attachment and
Garnishment-The Progeny of the Sniadach-Kelly Marriage, 49 N.C.L. REV. 763,
765 (1971). These atticles stand for the belief that the ramifications of Sniadach
will not result in any drastic changes, but with the admonition that future court
decisions will be the deciding factor.
34. See Hawkland, Prejudgment Garnishment of Wages After Sniadach, 75 CoM.
L.J. 5 (1970). Professor Hawkland anticipated that Sniadach would be limited only
to those situations involving special property interests, the taking of which produced
substantial hardships upon the debtor.
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resulted in a greater hardship than attachment of other forms of
property, it appeared that summary procedures not involving the
taking of "special" property fell outside the purview of Sniadach.
Many courts have accepted this limited interpretation of Sniadach
and have upheld other summary prejudgment remedies involving
property other than wages. For example, the court in First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Pomona Machinery Co., 5 allowed a
writ of attachment directed to an Arizona bank in an action by a
California bank to collect moneys due on a promissory note. The
court reasoned that there existed proper grounds for distinguishing
between depriving a wage earner of present cash flow by prejudgment garnishment and impounding reserve assets of a business enterprise, since the latter's rights were adequately protected by the
right to replevy. Similarly, in American Oil Co. v. McMullin,"6 the
court held that attachments or garnishments that were neither attachments of business property nor garnishments of wages were
valid, even though the property was seized without notice and without an opportunity to be heard. Referring to the Sniadach decision, the court stated: "We do not think that Sniadach was intended
to preclude all attachments and garnishments merely because some
'7
hardship may result. 1
On the other hand, a number of courts have reasoned that the
Sniadach decision, rather than being limited to specialized property interests, rests upon fundamental principles of due process without regard to the nature of the property seized. The contention
that prejudgment attachment procedures violate due process only
in cases involving extraordinary circumstances such as wage garnishment was rejected in Randone v. Appellate Department of Superior Court of Sacramento County.88 That part of the California prejudgment attachment procedure which permitted, prior to
notice or hearing, attachment of property upon the mere filing of an
action on a contract for -the payment of money was held violative of
due process. In that case, the court did not construe Sniadach as
carving out an exception only for wages or other like property,
35.
36.
37.
38.

107 Ariz. 286, 486 P.2d 184 (1971).
433 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1970).
433 F.2d at 1096.
5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
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but held that it simply applied the traditional due process analysis to summary prejudgment remedies. Declaring the statutory
scheme unconstitutional, the court held that the procedure sanctioned a deprivation of a debtor's use of his property prior to a judicial determination; the court did not consider the nature of the
property and the hardships attached to its deprivation.
Likewise, in Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc.,"9
the Minnesota court declared unconstitutional statutes which permitted the garnishment and impounding of accounts receivable
without according the parties the procedural safeguards guaranteed
under the fourteenth amendment.
Faced with the conflicting opinions of the lower courts that attempted to interpret the effect of Sniadach upon other traditional
summary procedures, 4 ° the Supreme Court was afforded the opportunity to choose between the narrow and broad interpretations in
41
its consideration of Fuentes v. Shevin.
The Fuentes Decision
Just as Mrs. Sniadach first learned of an action pending against
her when she discovered that her wages were frozen, Margarita Fuentes, a Florida resident, was unaware of an action against her
until a deputy sheriff arrived at her home to seize her stove and
stereo. The stereo and stove were purchased under a conditional
sales contract from a local retailer. According to the contract, Mrs.
Fuentes was entitled to possession unless she defaulted on monthly
payments. Mrs. Fuentes claimed that the stove did not work, but the
39.

286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).

40. Cases that have narrowly interpreted Sniadach and confined its ruling to
analogous fact patterns include: Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011,
1016 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102

(D. Conn. 1971); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150, 15152 (D. Hawaii 1970); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308, 1312-13 (D.D.C. 1970).
Cases that have construed Sniadach broadly: Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614,
622 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub non. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (Nov. 12, 1974); Collins
v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 396-98 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Santiago v.
McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 292-94 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Laprease v. Raymours Fum.

Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722-24 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109,
124 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 1257-58, 96
Cal. Rptr. 42, 57-58 (1971); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20,
23 (1969).

41.

407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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retailer disregarded her complaint. She then stopped making further
payments on the stove, but paid the balance due on the stereo. This
payment however, was treated by the retailer as if it were a prepayment on the entire contract. The retailer, claiming that Mrs. Fuentes
defaulted, initiated a suit, posted a bond equal to twice the value of
the goods, and submitted a form to the court clerk requesting a
writ of replevin. The writ was summarily issued, and the goods
were seized later that day. Had Mrs. Fuentes been afforded a
hearing before the seizure, she could have prevented the taking of
the stereo by explaining to the court that she had the lawful right
to its possession.
The facts of Fuentes demonstrate the state action required for
the application of the fourteenth amendment. The sheriff's seizure
of the property was clearly the act of an agent of the state, under
color of state law. As to "deprivation of property," the Court in
Sniadach had not considered whether the deprivation there was permanent or temporary, nor the effect, if any, of the distinction. The
Fuentes court approached the problem methodically, discussing
types of ownership, types of property, and duration of deprivation.
First, it expanded the Sniadach concept of property ownership to
include properties in which the debtor has less than full title. Under traditional property notions, Mrs. Fuentes' interest in the property seized might not have been protected as "property" under the
fourteenth amendment, since she was the purchaser of goods under
a conditional sales contract in which title rests with the vendor until
full payment of the purchase price. The court in Fuentes, however, expressly held that the deprivation of even a possessory interest
was sufficient to invoke the protection of the fourteenth amendment
4' 2
because it constituted "a significant property interest.
Sniadach apparently carved out an exception to the traditional
rule to allow the application of fourteenth amendment to "a specialized type of property"4' 3 under the theory that wages are essentials
of life. 44 Some courts held to the "necessity of life" test and refused
42. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 n.5 (1971).
43. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
44. Id. at 341-42. In Fuentes, prior Supreme Court decisions are cited to point
out that Sniadach did not carve out an exception. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972). Perhaps the answer to the confusion is that the Court is reinterpreting and
extending Sniadach to fit the facts of Fuentes.
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to require due process for non-essential items.4 5 According to the
lower court, Fuentes was such a case because the stereo was not a

necessity of life. 4 6 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this "necessity of life" test.
This reading of Sniadach ... reflects the premise that [this case]
marked a radical departure from established principles of procedural due
process. . . . [It] did not. . . . [It was] in the mainstream of past
cases, having little or nothing to do with the absolute "necessities" of
life but establishing that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing
before a deprivation of property takes effect ....
The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property" generally . . . It is
not the business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its
own critical evaluation . . . and protect only the ones that, by its own
' 47
rights, are "necessary."

Finally, Fuentes considered the length of time necessary for a
deprivation. Coincident to the holding that the deprivation of any
significant property interest falls within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court held that the length of a deprivation was

inconsequential:
The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10day or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant taking of property
by the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause. While
the length and consequent severity of a deprivation may be another factor
to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing, it is not decisive
4
of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind. 8

In Sniadach, the concept of due process was confined to balancing
the right of an individual to due process prior to a seizure against

the needs of society in certain extraordinary instances to provide
due process after the seizure.

Fuentes refined the due process is-

sue further by breaking it down into the balancing analysis and the
hearing analysis.
Balancing the rights of individuals against the needs of society

did not give the Sniadach Court much difficulty because no compelling state interest was presented and the seizure was not necessary to secure jurisdiction over the debtor. Fuentes repeated this
45. E.g., Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn.
1971); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308, 1312-13 (D.D.C. 1970).
46. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 958 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
47. 407 U.S. at 88, 90.
48. Id. at 86.
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analysis and concluded that some extraordinary situations may require the summary seizure of goods, but since the replevin statutes
under consideration were indiscriminate and overly broad, they
were unconstitutional. The Court noted that "there may be cases
in which a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that
a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods.""0 While this statement appears favorable to creditors, it should be noted. that the
use of the words "disputed goods" raises questions as to the full
meaning of the statement. If these words impose no limitation, the
statement implies ,that in specia1 situations demanding immediate
action, such as concealment or potential destruction of the goods,
the goods in dispute can be summarily taken. This language, however, can also be read to infer that summary seizure is permissible
only where there is a dispute as to the right to possession of the
goods between the debtor and creditor. So construed, the Fuentes
decision would permit summary seizure only in those cases in
which the property interests in the goods were divided between the
creditor and debtor, cases in which a secured creditor seeks to repossess the collateral to which his security interest has attached. If
the latter interpretation is the true meaning of the language, all
garnishment and attachment remedies would be impermissible unless the creditor gave the debtor prior notice and an opportunity
to be heard. It would seem more likely, however, that the Court
merely erred in its choice of words since affording notice and an
opportunity to be heard in critical situations where the debtor is
likely to destroy or conceal the goods would be requiring the creditor to cause the result he is attempting to avoid--destruction or disappearance of the goods.50
Procedural due process requires that parties whose rights are affected are entitled to a hearing. To enjoy that right, they must be
notified "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.""
The replevin statutes at issue in Fuentes authorized a hearing after
the seizure, prompting the question of whether a hearing after seizure was at a meaningful time, i.e., a time at which an arbitrary
49. Id. at 93.
50. See Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed? 79 CASE & COM.
3, 18-19 (1974).
51. 407 US, at 80,
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deprivation of property could be avoided. Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority in Fuentes, rejected the validity of post-seizure hearings. Noting that the purpose of due process was to prevent arbitrary takings, and not to provide a remedy after the fact, the court
stated:
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is
clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be
prevented. At a later hearing, an individual's possessions can be returned
to him if they were unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be awarded to him for the wrongful deprivation. But no
later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already
52
occurred.

The question of whether Mrs. Fuentes had waived her right to
due process was also considered. The seller contended that Mrs.
Fuentes waived her due process rights by signing an agreement that
provided: "[l]n the event of default of any payment or payments,
Seller at its option may take back the merchandise . . . .. The
Court noted that the terms were part of a standard form contract,
in small type, and with little explanation of their meanings. In addidition, there was a wide disparity in bargaining power between the
two parties. Weighing the above factors, the Court concluded that
there was no waiver of the right to due process. Since the Fuentes
Court found no waiver, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment applied. Relying on Sniadach, the Court found that
due process had to be afforded Mrs. Fuentes before there could be
53
a valid prejudgment replevin of her property.
The Fuentes dissent54 can be analyzed in terms of the balancing
approach to due process. Due process is a flexible concept, protecting individual rights against the state whenever it is necessary
or desirable to do so. In the dissent, Justice White proposed that the
debtor was being afforded sufficient protection to satisfy due process because, as a practical matter, most prejudgment seizures are
justified. The dissent concluded that it was not worth the trouble
against arbitrary takings when there was no permanent damage
suffered. After all, Justice White noted, "[d]ollar-and-cents con52.

Id. at 81-82.

53. Id. at 96.
54. The dissenters were Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 97.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:378

siderations weigh heavily against false claims of default as well as
against precipitate action that would allow no opportunity for
mistakes to surface and be corrected." 55 In addition, the dissent argued that since the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC
had not recommended a change in regard to remedies upon default,
the court should defer to those who have struggled with the default problems throughout the years.5
It should be noted that Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in Fuentes. Had they participated, there is no doubt in the
mind of this author that they would have dissented, making the result a five-four decision in favor of replevin rather than a four-three
decision against it.
The Constitutionalityof UCC Section 9-503
The Fuentes decision, by its specific holding, ended all conjecture occasioned by Sniadach. Fuentes allowed little latitude whenever a court faced a case that involved a creditor's prejudgment
seizure of property. Nevertheless, cases have challenged the validity of UCC section 9-503. This section allows summary repossession upon default by a secured creditor, so long as no breach
of the peace results.5 7 The main issue in such cases has been
whether repossession of goods by self-help involves sufficient state
action in the deprivation of a person's property as to invoke the
fourteenth amendment. The following is a brief summary of the
arguments utilized in the cases.
In its most patent form, state action involves the direct action by
the state. To illustrate, a uniformed law officer who enters someone's house and seizes property constitutes state action. In such a
case the state is acting directly-the agent's actions do not have to
be authorized. The fact that the agent was clothed with apparent
authority suffices to invoke protection under the fourteenth amendment. Repossession, however, is quite a different matter; the secured party ordinarily acts by himself, without the assistance of a
state officer. For this reason, some courts have failed to find the
55.

Id. at 100.

56.

Id. at 103.

57.

See Spak, supra note 1.
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direct state action necessary to subject repossession under section
9-503 to due process requirements.
For example, in Greene v. First National Exchange Bank,58
the court held that repossession was not a direct state action, so
that the fourteenth amendment guarantees did not apply.
The Fourteenth Amendment can control only the actions of states, not
private individuals. Therefore, because the operation of the statute involved
does not require the aid, assistance, or interaction of any state agent, body,
organization, or function, the state has not deprived the plaintiff of his
property. 59

Similarly, in Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank,6 0 a case arising out of
the repossession of an automobile, the court held that the parties
were simply acting pursuant to a private contract; the repossession
of the automobile, therefore, involved no state action. 6 '
While direct state action can be readily discerned in most instances, finding indirect state action poses a more difficult problem.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has found state action in a number of individual acts of racial discrimination. Under the old concept, it was thought that state action was only present where the
state was directly involved. Today, however, state action is held
to exist if a private individual conspires with an agent of the
state,6 2 if the actions of an individual may be summarily enforced
by the state as if part of an overt conspiracy, 63 or if the state
by issuing a
clothes the individual with the authority of state law
64
special police officer's badge to a private investigator.
According to Reitman v. Mulkey, 5 the mere enactment of a statute has been regarded as state action if it encourages, authorizes,
or permits an individual to perform an act that would be contrary
to due process or equal protection but for that state action. In
Reitman, California voters amended their state constitution to overturn state laws that prohibited discrimination in the sale of resi58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
Id. at 675.
362 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
Id. at 378.
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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dential real estate. The Supreme Court of California ruled that the
amendment was unconstitutional, since rather than merely repealing anti-discrimination laws, the amendment encouraged racial
discrimination and as such constituted state action. 6B The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the amendment made
the right to discriminate a basic state policy. Furthermore, stated
the Court, since the Supreme Court of California believed that the
amendment would significantly encourage and involve the state in
private acts of discrimination, the amendment constituted state action.
In Adams v. Egley,67 District Court Judge Leland Nielson of the
southern district of California relied almost exclusively on the Reitman decision in declaring repossession by self-help unconstitutional.
The court reasoned 'that in Reitman a state constitutional amendment was found to be state action because its effect caused outright
involvement of the state in the encouragement of discrimination.
Similarly, in a repossession case, the secured creditor repossesses
property without due process under the authority of section 9-503
of the UCC. The California court reasoned 'that in both cases, the
state's enactment of a statute had encouraged individuals to commit acts that they may have refrained from doing in 'the absence of
the statute. The enactment of section 9-503 of the UCC, therefore, was held to constitute a state action sufficient 'to involve
the fourteenth amendment. Since the taking involved a state action depriving an individual of his property without due process of
law, the California counterpart of section 9-503 was held unconstitutional.
Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' 8 reversed
the district court's ruling, finding no "significant state action"
and therefore the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
would not apply to self-help repossessions. The court relied on the
standard set forth in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,69 which de-

clared that state action could not be found unless the state had
66.
67.

64 Cal. 2d 529, 537-38, 413 P.2d 825, 831-32, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 887 (1966).
338 F. Supp. 614 (1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l

Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (Nov. 12,
1974).
68. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
69. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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"significantly involved itself"'70 with the challenged conduct. In
that case the court held -that the issuance of a license by the state
to sell liquor was not significant enough so as to implicate the state
in the racially discriminatory practices of a private club.
In addition, the Adams court found that Reitman could be distinguished on at least two grounds. First, in Reitman, the state was
involved to a far greater degree in the challenged conduct: the
legislation had authorized what had been previously proscribed,
and if allowed, it would frustrate a constitutional goal. However,
in self-help cases, the enactment of the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code did not reverse any law but merely codified existing law.
Second, the court was not convinced that the racial discrimination cases were analagous to cases involving self-help repossession
of secured property. The court reasoned that while racial discrimination cases evidence "intentional . . . circumvention of constitutional rights, . . . creditor remedies [are] based on economically
71
reasoned grounds of. . .long standing.
The court also found that Fuentes was not controlling: "We do
not read Fuentes so broadly that it encompasses all private actions
between individuals pursuant to their consensual undertakings. '"72
The court then declared that state involvement, for purposes of constitutional rights to due process, is not reflected by the enactment
of UCC section 9-503, which put into statutory form the common
law right of creditors to repossess without judicial assistance.
Similarly, in Oler v. Bank of America,7 3 a case in the Northern
District of California, the court declined to find state action by dis'tinguishing Reitman as a racial discrimination case to which 'the
fourteenth amendment was designed to apply. Reasoning that repossession was not the type of evil at which the fourteenth amendment had been directed, the court found that the "historical, legal,
and moral considerations" that were paramount in extending federal jurisdiction to meet racial injustices simply did not exist in
Oiler.74
70.
71.
72.
73.
74,

Id. at 173.
492 F.2d at 333.
ld. at 338.
342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal, 1972).
Id. at 23,
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Chief Judge Morgan, in Johnson v. Associates Finance, Inc.,75
relied almost exclusively on the decision rendered by the court of
appeals in Adams. The court held that the state, by its adoption of
the UCC, could not be held responsible for creating -the conditions
which resulted in the standardized contract ,that are typically used
in the credit industry, and which provide for self-help repossession
without notice or prior hearings. Such repossession by private parties, therefore, was not "state action." The court found in Fuentes,
state officials played an active role in the summary-taking, whereas
in the present case, repossession was accomplished wholly by the
actions of private persons. The court concluded that a decision
declaring Illinois' self-help repossession provision unconstitutional
would be an unwarranted extension of Fuentes. The same conclusion was reached by courts in Florida,76 Georgia,77 and Delaware.7"
Yet, other courts deciding similar problems have held otherwise.
In Hall v. Garson,79 the court was faced with the question of the
validity of the Texas distraint statute.80 This statute grants to the
operator of any apartment a lien upon certain personal property
found within the tenant's dwelling for all rents due and unpaid by
the tenant. The operator is also granted the right to enforce such
liens by preemptory seizure and retention of the tenant's property
until rent due has been paid. There is no provision in the statute
requiring any kind of hearing prior to seizure, although the tenant
may replevy distrained goods and bring an action in trespass for an
improper seizure. The court held that since the distraint procedure
authorized the landlord to use the traditional power of the state to
execute a lien, such a delegation of power amounted to state action.
Similarly, in Gibbs v. Titelman,8 1 a Pennsylvania statutory
scheme involving the repossession of motor vehicles was declared
unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the four75.

365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. I11. 1973).

76.
77.

Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
Shelton v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga. 1973).

78.

Giglio v. Bank of Del., 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch. 1973).

79.

468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).

80.

TEX. REV.

81.

369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-1063.

CIv. STAT. ANN.

art. 5238a (Supp. 1972).
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teenth amendment. The court first addressed itself to the argument
that self-help repossession is merely a codification of the common
law principle of distress or distraint and is therefore constitutionally
acceptable. After providing a most accurate description of the his,tory of the principle of self-redress,8 2 the court expressed its view as
to the present application of this extra-judicial remedy:
Certainly, our judicial system is sophisticated enough to redress the injuries
which once gave rise to the need for self-help, notwithstanding the constitutional proscription against a deprivation of property without due proc83
ess.

The court next considered the contention that the state involvement
in the repossession scheme is only passive and not significant
enough to warrant invocation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court rejected this "passive" versus "active" state action distinction as a basis for determining "color of
state law" where the deprivation of one's property is at stake. The
court went on to explain:
When a statute or even a common law custom allows an individual to
unilaterally transcend the fundamental and inalienable level of equality,
• .. that statute is clothing the individual with a power which can only
truly be consistent with the state. It is this power .. . that constitues
"state action."'8 4

To the extent that section 9-503 permitted self-help repossession,
such permission was construed by the court as being a license to
perform a state function; accordingly, it is subject to due process requirements.
Other lower courts have also overcome the state action problem
in repossession under UCC section 9-503. In Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc.,85 Chief Judge Holden of the Vermont federal district
court granted a preliminary injunction to halt the threatened repossession of a mobile home. Following the Hall v. Garson rationale,86 Chief Judge Holden found state action to be present and
the repossession statute unconstitutional as violative of the due process
clause of -the fourteenth amendment.8 7 Of particular note in the
82. Id.at 44-47.
83. Id. at 47.
84. Id. at 48.
85. 12 UCC REP. SERV. 543 (D. Vt. 1972).
86. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
87. In regard to due process, Fuentes is fairly particular in its holding that before
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decision is the court's utilization of Fuentes' arguments rather than

merely echoing the holding. The court intimated that repossession
would be allowed upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances
or immediate danger to the collateral,

as

but, in the absence of such

a showing, an injunction would issue to prevent the lawful taking. 89 Also, it was held that the creditor had not waived her right
to due process by signing the security agreement which permitted
repossession by self-help. As in Fuentes, the court found that the
signing of this agreement in fine print did not constitute a valid and

knowing surrender of the constitutional right to due process.9"
Here in the seventh circuit, our northern district held the Illinois

Innkeepers Lien Law9 ' to be unconstitutional in Collins v. Viceroy
Hotel Corp.92 Parallel to the Texas distraint law, under Illinois
law a hotel proprietor was granted the right to place a lien upon

,the property brought into his hotel by a guest, as well as the power
to summarily enforce the lien by seizing the property and selling it
upon non-payment of charges by the guests. In either case the
an individual can be deprived of his property by an action of the state, he must be
given reasonable notice of the action and afforded an opportunity to be heard prior
to the seizure. Some cases which have upheld the constitutionality of repossession,
however, ha~t distinguished Fuentes to avoid following its dictates.
Messenger v. Sandy Motor, Inc., 295 A.2d 402, 121 N.J. Super. 1 (1972), for example, held that due process was satisfied on a theory of waiver. Fuentes refused
to allow a waiver but the Messenger court distinguished car and stereo repossessions
inasmuch as everyone who buys a car knows that it will be repossessed if the payments are not made.
In Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, CCH Secured Trans. Guide, 52,186, 12 UCC
REP. SERv. 739 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 1973), Judge Weisberger held that he would
not extend Fuentes "one millimeter beyond the requirements of that case as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States." 12 UCC REP. SERv. at 742.
88. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 90-94. The spirit of Sniadach and Fuentes
compels a conclusion that such a holding is valid. If a creditor had reasonable
grounds to believe that the debtor will destroy or conceal the collateral, he could obtain a court order authorizing seizure, thus eliminating the need for summary repossession.
89. Accord, Newlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., CCH POVERTY L. REP.
16,202 (D.C. Neb. June 29, 1972) (temporary restraining order is issued; debtor to
resume installment payments); Zacharias v. Western Pa. Nat'l Bank, CCH POVERTY
L. REP. T 16,352 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 1972) (restraining order issued; debtor ordered
to post bond).
90. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93-94 (1972), citing Overmeyer
v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972), with Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERv.
543, 547 (D. Vt. 1972).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 71, § 2 (1969); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 82, § 57 (1969).
92. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. 11. 1972).
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proprietor could act without an opportunity for the guest ,to contest
the proprietor's claim. The late Judge Alexander Napoli held that
the state's passage of ,the statute constituted the state action necessary to find that a person has acted "under color of state law" under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
These procedures are almost identical with the repossession procedures under UCC section 9-503. Distraint, innkeeper's lien laws,
and repossession by self-help existed at common law to provide for
a summary disposition of outstanding debts. All three authorize the
taking of property in the possession of another without a prior hearing, and all three allow the taker to be the judge of whether a seizure should take place. In the event of improper seizure, distraint,
or repossession, state statutes allow for damages to ,the aggrieved
party. The differences between these procedures are that they deal
with separate and distinct legal relationships. Repossession may
be seen to arise from 'a contractual relationship, although the other
two procedures could be made contractual by including them in formal agreements, such as leases or waivers to be signed by guests
registering in hotels. Since the three procedures are of the Same
nature, it is incongruous for courts to decide the cases differently,
summarily finding state action in two but not the third.
One final argument that could be raised in support of denying the
constitutionality of self-help repossession is that any other result
would be anomalous and encourage breaches of the peace. While
replevin statutes have been held violative of due process even
though they provide for minimal procedural safeguards (i.e., bonding procedures, obtaining a writ from a clerk), self-help, if held
constitutional, would permit a taking of property where procedural
safeguards are completely absent. A debtor, by resisting the seizure to the point that the taking would be a breach of the peace,
would force the creditor to resort to replevin or other remedies that
fall within the purview of Fuentes and Sniadach, and thus require
procedural safeguards that the debtor would otherwise be denied.93
In the wake of Fuentes, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a
new replevin statute. 4 It provides that a defendant in a replevin
93.

Hawkland, supra note 34.

94. ILL.

REV. STAT.

§ 4b. § 4a:

ch. 119, §§ 1-28 (1973).

The relevant sections are § 4a and
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action be given five days notice of a hearing to contest the issuance
of a writ of replevin. Also in conformance with Fuentes, it provides
that a plaintiff may appear before a court in an ex parte hearing, and a writ of replevin may summarily issue upon a showing
by the plaintiff that he will suffer "immediately impending harm"
such as by destruction, concealment, removal from the state, perishability, or sale of the disputed property. Thus, in a procedure
similar to that required for the granting of a search warrant, a
writ of replevin may be summarily granted -and still not violate due
process.
The defendant shall be given 5 days written notice in the manner required
by Rule of the Supreme Court, of a hearing before the Court to contest the
issuance of a writ of replevin. No writ of replevin may issue nor may property be seized pursuant to a writ of replevin prior to such notice and hearing except as provided in Section 4b.
As to any particular property, the right to notice and hearing established
in this Section may not be waived by any consumer. As used in this Section, a consumer is an individual who obtained possession of the property
for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes.
Any waiver of the right to notice and hearing established in this Section
must be in writing and must be given voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.
Notice to the defendant is not required if the plaintiff establishes and the
court finds as a matter of record and supported by evidence that summary
seizure of the property is justified by reason of necessity to:
(a) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which
will result from the imminent destruction or concealment of the disputed
property in derogation of the plaintiffs [sic] rights in the property;
(b) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which
will result from the imminent removal of the disputed property from the
state, taking into consideration the availability of judicial remedies in the
event of the removal;
(c) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which
will result from the perishable nature of the disputed property under the
particular circumstances at the time of the action;
(d) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which
will result from the imminent sale, transfer or assignment of the disputed
property to the extent such sale, transfer or assignment is fraudulent or in
derogation of the plaintiff's rights in the property;
(e) recover the property from a defendant who has obtained possession
by theft.
At an ex parte hearing to determine if notice is not required, the court
shall examine the evidence on each element required by this Section or any
written waiver of rights presented by the plaintiff. If the court finds that
notice is not required, or that the waiver is in accordance with law, it shall
order a hearing as soon as practicable on the issuance of the writ of replevin.
Id. §§ 4(a)-(b). See generally Swygert, Consumer Protection, 1972-1973 Survey of
Illinois Law, 23 DEPAuL L. REV. 98, 155-57 (1973).
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In addition to Illinois, many other states have changed their replevin
laws to conform to the standards enuncited in Fuentes. Some
states, however, did not modify their replevin statutes. One such
state was Louisiana, whose law was challenged in the recent case of
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.9 5 The Louisiana statute provides that

a creditor seeking a writ of sequestration to sequester certain goods
pending the outcome of a lawsuit may petitition the court in an ex
parte action with a claim that the debtor may dispose of the property during the pendency of the legal proceedings. Although there
is no practical difference between this procedure and the scheme
denounced in Fuentes, the court, for reasons to be explained, upheld
the constitutionality of the statute because "Louisiana law provides
for judicial control of the process from beginning to end," 6 and is
not indiscriminate inasmuch as it allows for seizure upon a showing of danger.
The Mitchell dissent (Mr. Justice Stewart, with Justices Douglas
and Marshall concurring) soundly blasted the majority by pointing out the practical effect of the statute. "Whether the issuing
functionary be a judge or a court clerk, he can in any event do no
more than ascertain the formal sufficiency of the plaintiffs allegations, after which the issuance of the summary writ becomes a
simple ministerial act."'9 7 Since there is no practical difference between the two schemes, the dissent concluded that the court disregarded stare decisis and "[t]he only perceivable change that has
occurred since the Fuentes case is in the makeup of this Court."98
CONCLUSION

It is against the backdrop of Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell

-that the problem of repossession under section 9-503 of the UCC
must be considered. Many agree that these three cases stand for
the proposition that repossession by self-help is an indiscriminate
95. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
96. Id. at 1904-05.
97. Id. at 1912.
98. Id. at 1914. The possibility that the law would change in some respect as
a result of the court's membership was foreseen by the academic community. See
Spak, The Constitutionality of Repossession By Secured Creditors Under Article
9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 Hous. L. REv. 855, 867 (1973); Comment, Creditor'sRights, 3 LOYOLA U. OF CHICAGO L.J. 451, 461 (1972).
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taking of property without due process of law. 9 There is no hearing whatsoever prior to the finance company's taking of the debtor's
car from the driveway in the dead of night, and there need not be
any showing of -an emergency or danger situation to a court prior
to the seizure. The law's sole concern is that the debtor be in default under UCC prior to -the seizure of -the collateral. This approach totally disregards the Mitchell court's concern that a debtor
not be "at the unsupervised mercy of the creditor and court functionaries."'100
Yet, repossession by self-help has been upheld by most courts that
have considered the problem. The constitutional safeguard of the
fourteenth amendment prohibits action by the state which deprives
an individual of his property without due process of law. The
courts reason that the state is not a party to repossession.''
The Supreme Court will certainly hear a case on repossession
within the next few terms. At least two possible alternatives logically
present themselves. First, the Supreme Court could determine 'that
there is no, or at most an insignificant amount of, state action involved, as did the court in Adams, and dismiss the case for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The second alternative would be to find state action and then analyze repossession
in light of Fuentes. The Supreme Court could certainly apply the
Fuentes decision to repossession by self-help and still not terminate the
right of repossession. The Supreme Court could decide that UCC
section 9-503 violates due process because of its overbreadth, inasmuch as it allows indiscriminate prejudgment repossessions. Then
states would be afforded the opportunity to design legislation permitting repossession only in cases where "immediately impending
harm" would ensue. In those situations, the secured creditor could
appear before a judge ex parte, and prove -that the collateral is
in danger and must be seized by self-help immediately--or provisions could be- made for the posting of a bond by the repossessor to
protect the debtor in the event of mistaken repossession. In any
99. See Watson v. Branch Cty. Bank, 43 U.S.L.W. 2099 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 12,
1974).
100. 94 S. Ct. at 1904. The Mitchell majority expressly states that its decision
"will not affect recent cases dealing with garnishment or summary self-help remedies
of secured creditors or landlords." Id. at 1906 n.14.
101. See Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973);
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event, a post-seizure hearing would be held to determine title, exactly the same as in the old replevin action. In all other situations,
the secured creditor could proceed under the new replevin action,
providing notice of a pre-seizure hearing.
The advantages of -the modified repossession scheme are compelling, especially in the light of what the Fuentes dissent labelled
"the practical considerations involved.' ' 10 2 In the usual default
situation, the secured creditor seeks satisfaction before he decides
to repossess the collateral. In many cases, the debtor realizes his
inability to pay and tells the creditor to take the goods away. In
Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc.,0" ' the court related the testimony
of a witness who testified that out of 235 repossessions by his
bank, 120 were voluntary. It is safe to assume that these "volunteers" would not contest a replevin action; in fact, there would be
no need for a hearing if they surrendered the collateral.
Out of the remaining 115 debtors who did not voluntarily surrender the collateral upon default, it can be assumed that at least two
different types of debtors can be discerned. First, there will be
those who will be prone to conceal, sell, or otherwise dispose of the
collateral. The secured creditor would already know the identity of these problem accounts, so he could summarily repossess
upon default, pursuant -to the modified repossession scheme. The
second type debtor may not voluntarily return the collateral, but he
will not, in most instances, actively prevent its repossession. In
these cases, there is no danger in the debtor retaining possession of
the goods for the week or so until the hearing can be held.
There will, however, be situations where a debtor will forcibly
prevent repossession since, as noted earlier, if the taking gives rise
to a breach of the peace, the creditor is forced to pursue alternative
remedies such as replevin, which, according to Sniadach, requires
notice prior to the seizure. Thus, by actively restraining the seizure,
a debtor is assured of receiving procedural safeguards not otherwise
available under repossession. According to the modified statutory
scheme, these complications will be remedied since the secured
creditor will be able to appear before a judge ex parte and receive
judicial approval to proceed with the summary seizure.
102. 407 U.S. at 100.
103. 295 A.2d 402, 121 N.J. Super. 1 (1972).
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While the popular belief is that additional consumer protection
(notice) is directly proportional to the cost of commercial credit
-i.e., the more procedural safeguards afforded debtors, the greater
their cost in securing financial assistance-a recent article reports
an empirical survey of banks and retail establishments that suggest
otherwise.
An analysis of these overall results indicates that there is no need for
the credit market to be unduly concerned with the possible effects of Fuentes and Adams. Default occurs in only a small percentage of total
loans made. Creditors stated that in many of these defaults repossession
as a collection remedy is not feasible and in those few defaults where repossession is feasible, the vast majority of debtors will voluntarily give
up the collateral. This greatly diminishes the number of defaults
where involuntary repossession is an important collection remedy. Thus,
Fuentes and Adams will affect only a minute portion of the credit markets'
104
transactions.

Obviously such a conclusion upsets the conservative reasoning in
favor of repossession. In sum however, when "pinned to the wall"
for a prognostication, the authors are reluctantly led to the conclu-

sion that repossession statutes are not illegal, notwithstanding the
deprivation of due process of law by individual secured creditors.

The crucial feature of prejudgment repossession by self-help is
that the state is not actively involved in the seizure of property as it
was in the Sniadach and Fuentes instances.

104. Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the Consumer, A Legal and EmpiricalStudy, 4 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 23, 62 (1972).

